1. Why do they suggest the Basic Income? Do we need it? Is it legitimate?

Scholars such as Van Parijs suggest that BI can supply the opportunities of real freedom for all, especially for people who are lack of resources enough not to act what he does not want to do.

But do we all need it? Some may not, if it is needed only for the reasons above mentioned. If the BI is required to supply those who are not given the least opportunities for real freedom with what he lacks, then the BI is not required for the people with sufficient opportunities.

How do we admit that BI is legitimate?

2. Why the opponents go against the BI?

They insist that the BI does not meet the reciprocity and so it is not legitimate.

They adopt the reciprocity as a critical criterion according to Rawls who describes it, the criterion of mutual benefit, which should be satisfied even in an original position by the participants. He says "representative men do not gain at one another’s expense since only reciprocal advantages are allowed(1999: 89)."

Those who criticize the BI which is also provided to people who are not at work and will not, argue that the BI goes against the principle of reciprocity. They seem to remind himself of the old proverb that those who do not work should not eat. Rawls may be consistent with this line of thought when he refuses to put the Malibu surfer into the category of the least advantaged and to supply him with welfare subside from the public finance.
3. Should BI satisfy the reciprocity to be legitimate?

As the opponents claim that Bi is not legitimate because of violation of reciprocity, we should show BI does not violate it at least.

3-1) How are the BI and reciprocity considered to be related?

McKinon(2003) classified the theories of the BI in terms of the reciprocity and justice as below Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UBI is a requirement of justice</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (even though it violates reciprocity)</td>
<td>III (and we should prefer ‘participation income’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (and it does not violate reciprocity)</td>
<td>IV (but it is preferable to PI on pragmatic grounds)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

formulated by the author from McKinnon(2003: 153)

Type 1 includes Van Parijs, McKinnon write, and type 2 includes Bill Jordan, but they fail to assure Bi does not violate reciprocity.

3-2) How are the BI proponents to be convinced themselves that BI does not violate reciprocity?

Korean scholars such as Kwack(2013) who support the BI used to rely on Van Parijs(1995) when they argue that BI does not violate reciprocity, as it redistributes equally the common assets of external and internal endowments to which every man has an entitlement to share, and that it does not mean that who does not work exploits who works. They rather suggest BI does nothing to do with reciprocity because a man gets his share from the common as BI.

Why, but, should we redistribute equally the common asset? Do we have an entitlement to the equal share to the surplus which is derived from the distribution of endowments?

Rawls also admits the social ownership of natural endowments, when he wrote, "The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as in some respects a common asset and to share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the complementarities of this distribution(1999: 78)." But he refuses to distribute equally as a equal share. I agree to Rawls, when he says, "The simplest limit, or shape, to impose on distribution is strict equality in all social goods. Plainly the difference principle is not egalitarian in that sense, since it recognizes the need for inequalities in social and economic organization, of which their role as incentives is but one(2001: 68)."

So the proponents do not seem to me to successfully respond to the criticism that BI would violate reciprocity.
4. Does BI really violate reciprocity?

The proper response is, I think, given by Segall(2005). His argument can be summarized as follows. "Reciprocity-based objection to unconditional welfare such as BI is the claim invoking a civic obligation to work. ... It is a duty of each and every able-bodied citizen to work or to contribute something to the economy, and that citizens who betray this duty should have their welfare benefits denied." He suggests the distinction between duty of reciprocity and contractual obligation, and "the principle of reciprocity need not entail conditional exchange. That is, reciprocity can be interpreted as 'I will do this for you, in the hope that you will do something for me in the future, but me doing so is not conditional upon you reciprocating." "The work-test, therefore, is incompatible with welfare benefits as unconditional rights of citizenship. And when benefits are granted only conditionally, no reciprocal obligation to contribute on the part of welfare recipients obtains." The work-test cannot be justified on the grounds of some civic obligation to work or of a reciprocal duty to do so, nor is it compatible with the social right of citizens to welfare(Ibid).

An adult person who still lives at home with her wealthy parents and does nothing but watch soap operas all day, is not financially independent; she has no income and thus contributes nothing in tax. But unlike in the case of needy citizens, welfare contractualists are unwilling (or at least are resigned to not doing so, for practical reasons) to impose on such a person the work obligation.

cf. a duty of military service

That BI does not violate reciprocity is not sufficient to guarantee its legitimacy.

5. How is BI assured to be legitimate based on Ralws?

When a theory of justice was told to students in my class, an analogy of "gaepyung", which meant the cut of the winnings given to the loser at the end of the game by the winner in the poker or similar game in Korean, was found to be useful to have them understand the difference principle, because Koreans are used to gaepyung in the gambling game such as godori or poker with friends. Before the game we usually set up the rules including gaepyung which mainly amounts to one third or half of the amount the loser has lost.

The game analogy reminds me that we have experienced the free lunch in the game with friends. Some dissenting scholars contrast the BI with a free lunch and insist there is no free lunch. But I and my friends who played a poker with me in my graduate period had agreed to have a free lunch with a winner’s money in the future rounds in the game. To expense the payment of lunch for all players, we had agreed to collected the rake from the every round of the future game until it amounted to the planned payment, instead of having paid each meal himself for their own money nor collecting the same money from each player.

Why did we, the players accept to collect rakes from the winner’s luck for some rounds of the game? Why would we not let each player pay his meal for his own money? Why would we not collect the same money from each player? One of the reasons for that is that most players as poor graduate students didn’t have enough game money and so, if they would have paid their meals, the small game money would easily let them to lose the game. This, then, allows the rest of them to agree
to collect the rakes from the winner’s luck because the possibility that the lessened money by the payment or the same amount’s collection would make some players less win the game is felt as worth to make game less appealing and exciting. We were playing the card game not for the winning the money, but for the fun.

Why are we not supplying free lunch for all from the common money collected from the winner’s luck?

Rawls is well known to argue the theory of justice which consists of two principles, principle of equality and principle of difference. In original position participants who don’t know their own capabilities and preferences under the veil of ignorance are reasonably expected to agree that the inequality is allowed only to make the least advantaged better off after the basic goods are distributed equally according to the equality principle.

The participants in the social contract would agree to introduce the difference principle in afraid of falling into the situation of the least advantaged and to avoid it, which results from misfortunes and inferior conditions after the interactions among them and individual actions on their own risk. This is why we might need a redistribution in society and agree to it. But if we rethink the motive to accept the difference principle, i.e., to avoid the risk of misfortunes and to find a relief and assistance, we are not content that the misfortunes are done with the measure of redistribution. If participants would be afraid of being into the least advantaged, it is reasonable that he would want to be helped to prepare himself not to fail easily. Every one who reasonably admits the second principle would agree additional principle that each participant would be provided equally with such the opportunities and resources that he does not easily fall into the least fortunate. What would help a man not to easily fall into the least fortunate? Many including education and training can be considered, but a regular cash payment will reach to a consensus. A theory of justice should be complemented and completed with a third principle named a principle of preparatory enhancement or BI.

Rawls’ theory of justice is confined only to the subsistences at the end of the period when who are the least advantaged is finally revealed. He ignores his theory’s default which appears in his criticism to welfare state. He says, ”In welfare-state capitalism the aim is that none should fall below a decent minimum standard of life, one in which their basic needs are met, and all should receive certain protections against accident and misfortune, for example, unemployment compensation and medical care. The redistribution of income serves this purpose when, at the end of each period, those who need assistance can be identified. Yet given the lack of background justice and inequalities in income and wealth, there may develop a discouraged and depressed underclass man of whose members are chronically dependent on welfare. This underclass feels left out and does not participate in the public political culture(2001: 139-140).” He claims we need a property-owning democracy which can fix the short-comings of welfare state. He notes, ”Property-owning democracy avoids this, not by the redistribution of income to those with less at the end of each period, so to speak, but rather by ensuring the widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital(that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this against a background of fair equality of opportunity. The intent is not simply to assist those who lose out through accident or misfortune(although that must be done), but rather to put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and economic equality(139).”

Bi is also required to supply all the people with sufficient opportunities and means to be fully
cooperating members of society on a footing of equality during the period in addition to the property-owning democracy at the beginning of the period.

Reference

Kwack, Nowan(2013), ”Distibutional justice and sustainable maximum Basic Income,” *SidaeWaCheolhak*, vol. 24. no. 2. 7-28


