**Why High Enough Ain't Good Enough — Rethinking the Core of Basic Income Politics**

**Abstract:** This paper seeks to tackle the currently prevailing notion in the European Basic Income movement that the amount of the sum of money paid with regularity within an Unconditional Basic Income scheme is the main criteria by which to judge of that scheme's political orientation. Against that view, it emphasises: firstly, the fact that the effects of any transfer, be it in cash or in kind, is entirely relative to the rest of the social protection set up in which that transfer takes place; and secondly, that when dealing with the introduction of any substantial (re)distributive scheme, the net amount of the transfer often (if not always) matters far less than all of the other changes in that given social protection system that are bound to accompany its introduction. Furthermore, the idea that any amount of cash can ever, on its own, guarantee the autonomy of individuals, is denounced as a neoliberal, anarcho-capitalist fallacy — and challenged, with references to Virginia Woolf's *A room of one's own* and Karl Polanyi's notion of False Commodities. Direct implications are offered to be drawn as regards the concrete practical choices and implementation alternatives that will have to be made in the current and forthcoming implementation of Basic Income scheme policies. Finally, this paper proposes what ambitions to be a complete theoretical framework of Basic Income politics, able to illustrate graphically the essential differences between, and sources of conflicts amongst, basic Income supporters. Three ideal-typical forms of basic income scheme are thus each distinguished, located within the framework, and illustrated by a contemporary french basic income scheme proposals. While the level of the income *is* clearly the key element to judge of the transformative potential of two of the ideal-typical models and their related proposal, it is proved to be only but a secondary element to evaluate the transformative potential and political orientation of schemes belonging to the third ideal-typical model — to which almost every single realistic or short term proposals are shown to belong.
PLAN

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Introduction

The compass to complete the map

What drove explorers to overseas terra incognita? When not compelled by despair and life-threatening circumstances, the existence of incomplete maps covering vast spaces and the rumour of there being land on the other side of the water is assuredly part of the answer. Basic Income, as anyone who has ever but glanced at the literature or activity surrounding it would know, attracts people from nearly all forms of political persuasion. Consequently, it often gives rise to unexpected, paradoxical alliances, while provoking surprisingly aggressive debates amongst close friends and colleagues in otherwise very tightly knit and united organisations. The most surprising of those alliances, however, are often relativised by the fact that “there are many a Basic Income”, many a very different one, that is. They act as the rumours of the old days, reminding each basic income supporter that there is land on the other side of the water. In order to navigate through this diversity, as through anything, we shall need one of three things: a ship, a compass, and a map—however incomplete. Our ship has been provided for us by the BIEN: it is its carefully worded definition. As we shall see in this introduction, our incomplete map was waiting for us in the treasure chests of Basic Income Scholarship, between the lines of Philip Van Parijs' seminal 1990 paper. Finally, with the right political compass, we shall offer to complete that map, providing us with an instrument that may prove of invaluable help, even far beyond the shores of Basic Income politics. But we shan't travel that far here, and will pace ourselves for now to exploring only these already very rich lands, visiting its main islands to see who lives there. This will imply examining our final map closer, and looking at three contemporary French Basic Income scheme proposals, each as a prime examples of what we will argue to be the three ideal-typical forms this project can take (part 1). Richer of these many spoils, we shall then sail back home, and see how this new knowledge may contribute to the ongoing shipyard debates about our vessel’s built: the definition recognised by the BIEN. This will imply, firstly, sailing all the way from here to real world Brussels, and from there to Helsinki, on the trail of the relatively new notion of a “full” and “incomplete” Basic Income. We shall then retreat to our private quarters in the company of Virginia Woolf and Karl Polanyi, in order to reflect upon the results of this inquiry; Until, at last, we shall need to invite fellow foreign navigators Jurgen de Wispaere and Vida Panitch to join us for supper, in order for us to critically reflect together upon our travels to the basic income archipelagoes, and settle between ourselves these shipyard disputatios (part 2). Finally strong of all this new knowledge, and in such good company, we shall end our journey by paying a visit to Nancy Fraser in New York, in an attempt to devise the strategies for social change in our lands—on the lines of the formidably more advanced practices we will have witnessed, in our travels through to these Utopian Islands.
“Left and Right, although far from obsolete, are essentially a measure of economics. As political establishments adopt either enthusiastically or reluctantly the prevailing economic orthodoxy — the neo-liberal strain of capitalism — the Left-Right division between mainstream parties becomes increasingly blurred.”

To any French speaking person with even but a remote scholarly interest in Basic Income — or to anyone who ever had the slightest interest in the intersection between Basic Income and Political Ecology — these lines, and the accompanying graph below, taken from the homepage of The Political Compass™s Website, cannot help but bring up to mind Philip Van Parijs’ seminal 1990 paper Impasses et Promesses de l’Ecologie Politique, and it\'s 2009 translation Political Ecology: From Autonomous Sphere to Basic Income, part 1 of which opens on these words:

“The political space of industrial society can be depicted as a line drawn from the extreme right of the all-encompassing market to the extreme left of the all-encompassing state.”

Also profoundly dissatisfied with this simplistic representation, Van Parijs however set up to offer not a compass, but a map:

“The political space of post-industrial society, by contrast, should be depicted as a triangle whose base is formed by the line just described, and whose third angle corresponds to what would be a fully “autonomous” society. (…) ”

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1 Political Compass
2 Van Parijs, Political Ecology: from autonomous sphere, p.2
3 Van Parijs, Political Ecology: from autonomous sphere, p.2
Van Parijs develops the theoretical basis of this model a little further in a passage that it is worth quoting at length here:

“(…) The expression “autonomous sphere” is here used in a purely subtractive sense, to refer to one category of productive activities broadly conceived, that is, one subset of contributions to the creation of goods and services useful to oneself or to others. This subset comprises all the productive activities whose products are neither sold on the market nor commissioned by a public authority. It is in this sphere that we move, for example, when we mow the lawn or give birth, when we organise a street party or correct a Wikipedia entry (...)

Thus defined by simple subtraction, it is tautologically true that the autonomous sphere exhausts, along with the market sphere and the state sphere, the whole of productive activity. But one can allow for intermediate activities: public enterprises between the state and the market, subsidized non-profit associations between the state and the autonomous sphere, and maybe cooperatives and so-called local exchange systems (but not the black market) between the autonomous sphere and the market.”

In his 1990 paper, Van Parijs even went as far as to graphically illustrate this theoretical framework, naming it after the contemporary economist Serge Christophe Kolm, as an homage to the latter's work on general reciprocity:
Perhaps out of the deep modesty which characterises him, however, Van Parijs did not bother to graphically illustrate the following lines, which constitute nonetheless, what is arguably one of his most original contribution to political science.

“(...) In a post-industrial society, the doctrinal debate is no longer bipolar – between liberals and socialists – but tripolar – with the addition of ecologists, whose specific characteristic is that they promote the autonomous sphere against the influence of both the market and the state.”

From the moment I came across this paragraph, it read to me as instructions for the drawing up of something like a map of the western political spectrum, on which political forces are located according to the concrete change that they try to bring about in society. The Western political spectrum then, according to Van Parijs (1990), would look something like this:
Now, while I fully endorse to this day the bulk of this first part of Van Parijs' analysis, and have done so ever since I had the chance to come across it, nearly ten years ago now — I have however, and from that very same moment, as strongly disagreed with the following paragraph as I agreed with what had preceded it:

“Whatever the precise criterion adopted to circumscribe the three spheres, it should be clear that nobody can wish our societies to be driven into one of the three corners of this triangle, i.e., to become entirely market-governed, entirely state-controlled or fully autonomous. And it should be no less clear that nobody can affirm that one of these spheres is intrinsically superior to the other two, in the strong sense that any productive activity that belongs to it is necessarily good, whereas activities that belong to the other two spheres are necessarily bad. Those in favour of more market or more state cannot deny that both the market and the state support dirty jobs and useless work. And the same holds for the autonomous sphere. Nothing immunises it against polluting activities (e.g., mowing one’s lawn on a tractor), nor against patriarchal oppression (the family sphere makes up a sizeable portion of the autonomous sphere), nor against inefficiency — there is no lack of associations whose meetings are largely spent going round in circles or making decisions that are never implemented.”

Not only is this not clear, this analysis appears to me today, as it did ten years ago, to be plainly wrong. For it seems to me that some peoples do wish for our societies to be either entirely market governed; or entirely autonomous; or even (yes, some of them do still exist) entirely state governed! They are parochially known, respectively, as Anarcho-Capitalist, or Libertarians; Libertarian-Socialist, or Anarchist; and good old Marxist-Leninist and Trotskyist, or Communists! And each of these movements do affirm, and even spend most of their time as movement claiming loud and clear, to anyone that will listen to them, that the “sphere” of production, or mode of administration they believe in, is intrinsically superior to the other two — in exactly the “strong” sense that any productive activity that belongs to it is necessarily good, whereas activities that belong to the other two spheres, or are even so much as influenced by them, are necessarily bad.

That seems to be precisely the argument made, for instance, by anarcho-capitalists such as David Friedman, who moved beyond his father to advocate that even justice and defence “services”

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4 Van Parijs (2009), Political ecology ... , emphasis added
should be privatised, as in “run for profit by private individuals”, arguing that this would yield more efficient results in these domains, as it would, to him, in just about anything and everything. Furthermore, I for one have personally come across many a partisan of full marketisation or complete rule by the state that had no problem in denying that their preferred mode of administration ever supported dirty jobs and useless work! Granted, they systematically do so by arguing that what looks like it is actually the result of distortions created by the other mode of administration: thus dirty jobs and useless work created by the markets, to believing anarcho-capitalist, are the results of “Crony Capitalism”, a perverted version of that best of all possible systems for which states' unholy and omnipresent actions are to be blamed; while their state counterpart, for practicing communists, are to be blamed on the decadence of the state apparatus, a direct consequence of the bourgeois corruption and nepotism brought about by the capitalist system— but the point remains: for each side, someone can be found that does argue that all these bad things have nothing to do with the “sphere” they defend, and are to be blamed entirely on the others. And don't go thinking that it would be any different with Anarcho-Communists, in fact these people are first in line here: just ask any learned one of them to tell you about the Spanish Civil War and explain to you why the CNT's libertarian-socialist revolution did not succeed, and you'll quickly find out!

Now I have to confess to having obtained the most outrageous of those statements from tired, irritated and sometimes even tipsy life-long militant, more interested by action than by political theory, with little to no academic formation, or even sometime school education, involved merely as little hands in the practical machinery of the organisations affiliated to these strains of thought— which I had, to make things even worse, purposefully and malignly set out to annoy at a moment of weakness, such as the end of a large congress, and not stop until they told me what I wanted to hear. Nonetheless, I did get to hear it.

I won't throw the stone at Van Parijs for not having sank that low. If anything, that is yet another sign of his sense of academic chivalry, respect and honesty. Yet, his unwillingness to address the lay-militant's bar counter political theory and judgements, in so much as it relates to his commitment to always look for the most articulate and learned representative of rival positions, is certainly what caused him not to develop further a brilliant insight. For, as Spinozist scholars have successfully demonstrated many times over, and repeatedly emphasised, politics has a lot more to do with religion than with reason. Politics is the realm of Passions, happy and sad. Ignoring the more extreme views, and failing to account for the unreasonable or outrageous propositions, even in
good faith, out of compassion and respect for those who unreflectively hold them, does not make those position fade away.

Yet even this statement seems far too severe a judgement, for it is very hard to answer unreasonable propositions from a reasonable perspective, without it looking like shooting on ambulances — and no one should ever be blamed for refusing to do such a thing. Respectfully answering unreasonable propositions from a reasonable perspective requires us to acknowledge the aforementioned spinozist insight, and consequently to find a way to account for their existence without opposing them. Something a topographical approach, such as the mapping perspective developed here, is much more suited to do than the defence of either a particular political perspective or the realism and reasonableness of a particular policy which characterises Van Parijs' 1990 and 2009 papers.

Finally, Van Parijs' commitment to reasoned, enlightened and peaceful discussion can be taken as an indication of his belonging to the large family of pragmatist liberalism. This trend of liberalism, originally theorised and advocated by the likes of John Dewey and, more recently, by someone like Jeremy Waldron, is characterised by a strong democratic ethos and commitment to democratic values of peaceful dialogue. We shall come back to this strain of thought latter in the paper. For no, however, this remark, combined with Van Parijs' explicit situated theorising, gives us enough instructions to be able to draw up a wider and considerably more precise map of the western political space out of the same 1990 paper. A map that would look something like this:
b. ... and back. 'Beyond Party lines and politics': Mapping the spectrum of western political theory

Now that we have established a rough map of how these huge groups and vastly different theories are positioned in relation to one another, let us direct our attention for a moment to some of the work that has been done on the elaboration of a political compass — and systematically compare
them to our map in order to see how it can help widen our horizons. The website that bears this very name, a quote from which opened the previous section, seems like a good point to start. Here then is the main reproach it levies against the traditional left/ right divide, and the answer it has to offer:

“If we recognise that this is essentially an economic line it's fine, as far as it goes. (...) That deals with economics, but the social dimension is also important in politics. That's the one that the mere left-right scale doesn't adequately address. So we've added one, ranging in positions from extreme authoritarian to extreme libertarian.”

Which gives us *The Political Compass™*, as it appears online since 2001:
The first striking element when comparing this compass to our map is, rather obviously, that they are made of different geometrical figures. Which does come as a reminder that few maps come in the shape of a triangle — and may hint to the fact that our original map might be cropped or incomplete. One this first impression has passed however, we may notice that the left-right divide in this compass strongly resembles the state - market dichotomy and related socialist - liberals opposition in our map, which Van Parijs tells us has been going on for as long as we have been in an industrial (as opposed to post-industrial) society, and may therefore serve as a useful point of reference. Taking into account that our map is very likely to be cropped, chances are it could fit nicely along that line on one or the other side of the compass. And surely enough; it does:
Seen in this way, the first teaching of the Political Compass™ for us can be to underline for us the ambivalence of the “Autonomous Sphere”, which Van Parijs did warn us was not filled only with consensual practices, by taking precisely the example of household abuse, the arch micro-fascist practice.

Another very interesting point of departure is the chart developed by David Nolan, a founding member of the US Libertarian Party. Closing down on its target's positions through their take on “personal” and “economic” freedom, it uses a more situated and somewhat less consensual language, but a remains very interesting attempt at shining light on the western political spectrum. It also serves as the basis for “the world's shortest political quizz”, an US Libertarian party campaign tool that locates you on there in just 10 questions.
There again, the Kolm triangle fits rather nicely into this way of representing the political spectrum. One could argue that the state sphere angle should be situated on the bottom left, at the totalitarian/populist/authoritarian edge — which is what the version of the “world's smallest political quizz” invites us to do by naming this side “statist big government” — but this would not fit with Van Parijs' view that no one wishes for society to be administered wholly by one sphere. Moreover, the libertarians could be characterised as those wishing for society to be entirely autonomously administered, and so this axis, characterised in the very biased term of the US libertarian campaign tool version, actually sounds more like the far borders of our map expanded from the Kolm triangle. Besides the opposition that has been going on during the industrial period which Van Parijs tells us about is clearly that of the left against the right and the fact that many US libertarians favour Basic Income too, would seem to back up this parallel:

![The Kolm Triangle in the Nolan Charts](image-url)
O.J.C. Lester (1994),
*The political compass: why libertarianism isn’t right-wing*

McGann (1967)

Realizing that the circular theory is unacceptable, Mr. McGann suggests the linear theory of the political spectrum (Figure 2) as a more valid alternative. The linear theory classifies possible political (or a-political) conditions by their degree of regimentation of the people by the state. Regimentation, of course, may vary from 0 to 100 per cent.²

*Bryson & McDill (1968)*

**The Political Spectrum: a bi-dimensional approach**

[rotated 90° from its original presentation]
But it is the history of both those popular graphical compass that may prove even more interesting to us. It would seem that The Political Compass™'s anonymous website actually owes much to an eponymous paper by Jan Clifford Lester. There he traces the history of the elaboration of this axis from an insatisfaction with the “circular theory” of the political spectrum through to the empirical work of Maddox & Lilie (1984) and to The Political Compass™. In this its history parallels that of the Nolan Chart, which builds on an exchange which happened in the year 1967-68 in the libertarian “Rampart Journal of Individualist Thought”. In the 1967 issue, Laurence McGann published a paper entitled “the political spectrum” where he also criticised the “circular theory”, and proposed instead a “linear theory”. In the 1968 issue, Bryson and McDill offered to enhance it by adding a second dimension in their “the political spectrum: a bi-dimensional approach” (see previous page)

Another milestone, though less famous, attempt at representing the political spectrum is to be found in Christie & Meltzer's 1970 “The Floodgates of Anarchy”. This chart has over all the precedent ones the advantage of incorporating 4 bipolar scales instead of two, turning the side of the chart into poles and allowing for a finer grain analysis and political positioning.

“Party Lines and Politics”
(in Christie & Meltzer [1970], The Floodgates of Anarchy)
There again, the Kolm triangle fits nicely in both Bryson & McDill's, which resembles much the Nolan Chart, as well as in Christie & Meltzer's.
At this point, we have arguably collected enough cartographic material to be able to reconstruct and develop our own from it. A necessary first step in this enterprise is the gathering of all the similarities we have established between these five maps and compasses' cardinal points:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous sphere</td>
<td>Ecologists</td>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>libertarian</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>Anarchism</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>State Sphere</td>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Liberals [US context]</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>State Communism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Sphere</td>
<td>Liberals [European context]</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Capitalist Individualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Totalitarian/Populist/Statist (Big Government)/Authoritarian</td>
<td>Statism</td>
<td>Fascism</td>
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The first thing this chart does is to confirm and make clearer still the oddness of the triangular shape of Van Parijs' 1990 representations, which makes the fourth cardinal point we have discovered come out more. But we shall come back to try and explain this point further in the paper. More importantly perhaps, what eventually comes out from this exercise of cross analysis is the degree to which these cardinal points overlap. And if the first effect is therefore to confirm its pertinence, the real interest seems to lie in the invitation to widen the vocabulary used to refer to each ideological poles of attraction. In so doing, it invites us to comparisons, bringing water to our mill in the form of propositions to be tested out, evaluated and, eventually, either validated or rejected.

The second important step in the processing of all of the informations contained in these graphs is the gathering of the operations of combination between these cardinal poles that these graphs offer, and of what they see as coming out of these. This proves all the more necessary, as some of the figures use multiple spectrums and place at their edges what seems like ideological formations rather than poles. This enterprise shall allows us to review each figure from a new perspective, and to narrow down what appears to us as strong or interesting and weak or less relevant points to our
endeavour of building a more precise map of the western political spectrum. Let us therefore review each map in turn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Political Compass™ (2001)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combinations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Authoritarian + Left = Authoritarian Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian + Right = Authoritarian Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian + Left = Libertarian Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian + Right = Libertarian Right</td>
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The “disarmingly simple” set of combinations offered by The Political Compass™ graph, to paraphrase a formula which Philip Van Parijs has successfully managed to associate with Basic Income, is appealing. Yet what makes its strength is also what leaves us deeply unsatisfied, for at this level of conceptual abstraction, it is hard to know what to make of it. Furthermore laying out flat these categories makes apparent that they are all fundamentally relative. Consequently, this compass seems less adapted to international comparisons of the types which Basic Income scheme proposal requires than the others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Nolan Chart (1971)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combinations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+) personal freedom + (+) economic freedom = LIBERTARIAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+) personal freedom + (-) economic freedom = LIBERAL [US context]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-) personal freedom + (+) economic freedom = CONSERVATIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-) personal freedom + (-) economic freedom = TOTALITARIAN/ POPULIST/ BIG-GOVERNMENT-STATIST/ AUTHORITARIAN</td>
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with:
(+)= Favours strong degree of
(-)= Favours weak degree of

The nolan chart keeps it simple but offers, in it's overtly biased and situated viewpoint, an attempt at correcting the defects of the Political Compass™, by being a little more concrete. However, doing

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so with quite controversial categories whose meaning tends to vary greatly according to specific national situations (liberal, libertarian, conservatives), it fails by that which had made it more successfull. Being so specific to the US political scene, the categories it offers seem almost as complicated to compare internationally than the overly abstract ones of The Political Compass™.

But the chart regains this international potential through its dimensional poles of measurement, which take the forms of spectrums rather than cardinal points. Thus, through the combination of the relative axes of preference in personal and economic freedom, combined with very specific and located agents, the chart touches to something like the universal character which we aim for.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bryson &amp; McDill (1968)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combinations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>left + anarchy = classical marxism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anarchy + right = aristocratic oligarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right + statism = monarchy, fascism</td>
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<tr>
<td>statism + left = socialism</td>
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Bryson & McDill's Bi-Dimensional approach, though sending us back to a very high level of abstraction, helps us a great deal by introducing more meaningful and figurative concepts to precise the meaning of the very relative and context specific left-right dimension. It thus offers us to replace the rather abstract relative Libertarian-Authoritarian opposition by the Statism-Anarchy one — echoing the State-Market divide of the Kolm Triangle. Interestingly enough, “Anarchy” here may be understood both in the most commonly accepted usage of the term (that is as a synonymous for chaos) AND at what the political theory of anarchism calls for. In so doing, it presents us with terms that both side of the spectrum could accept as describing them — another very interesting point of the Kolm Triangle and Van Parijs' representation of the Political Spectrum.

Another Key point there is the distinction between a Statist Left under the name “Socialism” (which probably refers to what was then actually-existing socialism, or collectivism) & an anarchist left, under the heading “classical marxism”. This distinction, which echoes that of The Political Compass™ between authoritarian and libertarian left seems to hold a very important insight of which any and every Unconditional Basic Income supporter on the left has the experience of.

Finally, if the distinction on the right between “monarchy, fascism” and “aristocratic oligarchy” seems a lot less fine grained than that which they make on the left, the second system of opposition
in which they are inscribed appears extremely interesting and relevant to our endeavour. But we shall come back to treat that point in depth latter on in the paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christie &amp; Meltzer (1970)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st degree combinations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism + totalitarianism = state communism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totalitarianism + capitalism = fascism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalism + individualism = capitalist individualism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collectivism + individualism = anarchism</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>2nd degree combinations</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>state communism + fascism = fabianism (Centrist totalitarianism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fascism + capitalist individualism = conservatism (Centrist capitalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalist individualism + anarchism = radicalism (Centrist individualism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anarchism + state communism = Social Democracy (Centrist collectivism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, Christie & Meltzer's graphic depiction of “Party Lines and Politics” presents us with brilliant combinations, whose pertinence appears instinctively as very pertinent — and yet lacks the sort of logical coherence and guarantee of systematic consistence provided by such basic and self-refering framework as that of the Nolan Chart or The Political Compass™.

What makes this comes out the most is maybe the odd places of fabianism, conservatism, radicalism and social democracy, in the middle of, respectively, the totalitarian, capitalist, individualist and collectivist spectrum. Their position could (should?) tend to make them the pure form and prime representative of these ideological poles. Yet they seem more aptly characterised as the centrist form thereof, and should probably, therefore, appear closer to the centre of the figure. This is a key element which Van Parijs' Spectrum allows us to bring back to our effort, by being the only figure here to place more than two points on the lines. But we may remark in passing, before turning to the results of our efforts, that the use of the very british category of “Fabianism” appears as another limitation of this chart, although a very small one.

At which point it would seem that, having a much better view of the strong and weak points of each of the figure we have gathered here so far, we are finally in a position to construct our own, by completing the one map by which we started : Van Parijs' Political Spectrum. We propose to
complete it in three main ways: firstly, by adding our missing corner and figuring its “political family”, in the form of the ideal typical political formations which represent it, both in the field of liberal-democratic representative politics as well as in that of extra-parliamentary politics. Secondly, drawing from those maps that used not only their corners as cardinal points, but also their sides, we may now take advantage of having moved from a set of triangles to a set of squares and make the most of those two sets of opposed lines, turning them into spectres whose poles are formed by our cardinal points. For the sake of clarity, this will allow us to draw out the lines crossing through the centre of our figure which separates the field of influence of one side, where the position of the object located is to be read first through that side's spectrum, from the field of influence and attraction of the other side. Finally, our third and last effort to complete our map thus far should be to attempt to elaborate a system of combination aspiring to the consistency and pristine clarity those of The Political Compass™ and the Nolan Chart's, while not renouncing the sophistication of Christie & Meltzer's. Here, then, is our attempt at doing so:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some Fundamental Theoretical Conceptions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st degree combinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism + Socialism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialism + Individualism</td>
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<td>Individualism + Capitalism</td>
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<td>Capitalism + Collectivism</td>
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= Commununism
= Anarchism
= Anarchism-Capitalism
= Fascism

Following on the intuition drawn from Bryson & McDill to separate “Socialism” from “classical marxism”, we preferred to rename the latter (which stood for the anarchist, or libertarian left) as “Socialism” — while the former seemed to us to be more appropriately designated by the term “collectivism”, drawn from Chrste & Meltzer. This distinction then facilitated greatly the same work on the other side, as socialism could be opposed to capitalism, which could then be distinguished from individualism, itself opposed to collectivism; thus completing our map of extra-parliamentarian politics.

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<th>Some Fundamental Political Conceptions</th>
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<tr>
<td>2nd degree combinations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statist + Liberals = Socialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian + Liberals = Ecologists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market + Liberals = Capitalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian + Liberals = Conservatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= Centrist Communist
= Centrist Anarchist
= Centrist Anarcho-Capitalist
= Centrist Fascist

7 As this may appear as the most controversial result of these combinations, we must first of all admit that the labels of “ecologists” and “conservatives” are the most context specific, referring directly to the western continental european partisan political space at the beginning of the 20th century. We do however believe this analysis to be correct, and take the movement in the french right-wing historiography to rehabilitate italian fascism by distinguishing it from Hitlerist Nazism as an indication of its pertinence.
Finally, the configuration of the liberal-democratic political space of representative politics was rather easy to draw out, as starting from Van Parijs' Political Spectrum allowed us to correct Christie & Meltzer's problematic figuration of more “centrist” forces to the side rather than … the centre.

Here, then, is our completed map from Van Parijs (1990)'s Political Spectrum:

**Some Fundamental Theoretical Conceptions as applied to Political Reasoning**

![Political Spectrum Diagram](image-url)
**Reading cues:**

**Capitalism & capitalism-ist:** The organisation of society by which personal economic profit is set as the prime determinant of most to all actions & those who believe this form of organisation to be the best of all possible ones.

**Collectivism & Collectivists:** The belief that form of collective organisation and/or of property are systematically the most conducive to efficient results & those who abide by it.

*Nb:* Collectivism & Capitalism being two forms of authoritarianism.

**Socialism & Socialists:** The organisation of society by which social good (however defined) is set as the prime determinant of most to all actions & those who believe these forms of organisations to be the best of all possible ones.

**Individualism & Individualists:** The belief that form of organisation revolving around one individual and/or of individual property are systematically the most conducive to efficient results & those who abide by it.

*Nb:* Socialism and Individualism being two forms of Libertarianism.

**Pragmatism Liberalism:** Definition of Liberalism as roughly speaking covering representative democratic (parliamentary) politics.

**State — Market:** Preferred agent or mode of regulation of the economic production, preference for embedded regulatory agent and “self regulation” (market) or for exogenous regulatory agent (state).
At this point, however, maybe to call our work a cartography is a little too ambitious, for what we are doing is sensibly more speculative than topography, and probably bears more resemblance with the work of astronomers mapping constellations, or with that of theologian-leaning anthropologists, reconstructing the cosmology and polytheist pantheon of a strange people they would have lived amongst for some time. One that tune, and before stepping back to consider our figure in greater detail to see how it can shine a new light on the Unconditional Basic Income debates from which it was born; we may take but a moment to consider the words of a formidable scholar, who undertook works that could even be put on a par with that of Van Parijs, although it short of the graphical representation, and who also declares himself as speaking from inside Pragmatist Liberalism's political space — far more preoccupied, however, by what happens inside of it than by the worlds outside of it. And as we must temporarily interrupt our observation of the heavens, we may only hope that these lines can be of assistance to those who come after us in pursuing our inquiry further:

The Rule of Law is one star in a constellation of ideals that dominate our political morality: the others are democracy, human rights, and economic freedom. We want societies to be democratic; we want them to respect human rights; we want them to organize their economies around free markets and private property, and we want them to be governed in accordance with the Rule of Law. But constellations can deceive us. The juxtaposition of stars in a constellation is not necessarily indicative of their proximity to one another. Their apparent proximity may just be an artifact of where they present themselves in our visual field—the sky, as we call it, which for us is basically two-dimensional even though in astronomical fact it reaches in a third dimension away from us almost to infinity.

And so too in the constellation of our ideals. We think of democracy and the Rule of Law or human rights and the Rule of Law as close, even overlapping ideals. But it may be important to maintain a sense of the distance between them. There are multiple ways in which we evaluate social and political systems, multiple ways in which social and political structures may respond to or excite our concerns, and unless we buy into a very general holism—something like the position put forward in Ronald Dworkin's new book, Justice for Hedgehogs, in which all our ideals, however scattered, come down more or less to the self-same thing—there is not a lot to be gained by collapsing any one of them into any of the others.

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8 Stars may appear close enough to one another to be grouped into a single formation—the Southern Cross or whatever—yet that’s just the way they seem. It’s a matter of their placement in what is in effect a two dimensional visual field, and the apparent proximity of (say) Mimosa and Gacrux in the Cross formation—the giant blue star at the left hand beam and the cool red giant at the top of the cross—belies the fact that the latter (a cool red giant) is much closer to earth than the former (88 light years as opposed to 353 light years away). [Note from the original]

9
1. Mapping Basic Income Politics

“With Maturity comes the need to rethink the ideal of a universal basic income”
— Jurgen de Wispelaere and Lindsay Stirton, The Many Faces of Universal Basic Income

At this point, and before getting into a more detailed analysis of this completed map, we need to answer a very fundamental and basic question: why, if our subject here is Basic Income, and more precisely even the question that forms the title of this paper: “why high enough [a Basic Income] ain't good enough”; why then spend so much time, ink and paper into an overfed introduction, looking at all encompassing representation of the political spectrum?

The answer is rather straightforward, and forms the central thesis of this paper: *the transformative potential, political orientation and concrete effects of a Basic Income Scheme are not to be found in the scheme itself, but rather in all the other changes it causes to the system of social protection in which it is introduced*. The scheme's details, such as the amount, regularity, and level of the payment, considered in isolation, won't ever on their own tell us anything significant about what the scheme's transformative potential, political orientation or concrete effects. For, as de Wispelaere and Stirton put it: “universal schemes that are substantially similar in design may still end up producing widely divergent outcomes because of different interaction effects with policies already in place”.10

In other words, the essential point is not the net amount all the beneficiaries will receive, it is the difference in the distribution of wealth before and after the scheme's introduction. The fundamental questions, when dealing with the introduction of a universal basic income, as with any measures of this dimension and importance, is to know who will be the net beneficiaries of this introduction, and who will be the ones to pay, either by loosing potentially illegitimate privileges or by being exploited more.

The consequence of this fact is that the important thing, when considering a Basic Income scheme, is not an internal criteria like its amount. Rather, the key element to take into account and that needs to be looked at first, when evaluating and comparing Unconditional Basic Incomes Schemes, are the number of other measures which are bound to accompany any scheme's implementation: where is the money coming from? Through new taxes, or by raising existing ones? If so, which ones? Are other state benefits or tax credits being suppressed, or modified by or together with, its

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introduction? All these measure assuredly gives us a better understanding of the differences introduced in the distribution of Wealth and in the social protection system, considered holistically, through the implementation of a scheme. In order to understand the political orientation and best maximise the transformative potential of the scheme, as well as to be in a position to evaluate and estimate its effects, therefore, it is imperative to develop an analysis of the wider vision or a different social protection and distribution of wealth that incorporate the idea of an unconditional basic income. Which is precisely what our map can now help us to narrow down.

1.1 Some fundamental theoretical conceptions as applied to political reasoning

1.1.1. On Pragmatist Liberalism

The square at the centre of the map is the space of pragmatist liberalism. This view of the liberal cathedral, to paraphrase one of its most ardent contemporary partisan, can be summed up (a little abusively of course, but still) in the proposition that for almost any issue a solution can be found that will satisfy everyone and that it can be arrived at through peaceful, organised and relatively non violent democratic exchanges.

Liberal Pragmatists — which for the purpose of this paper, but also for the sake of clarity and political transformation generally, in our opinion, are the only ones who should be parochially known as Liberals — are therefore those willing to enter into practical arrangement making these exchanges possible, such as representative democracy generally, and parliamentary politics in particular. Non liberal in the pragmatist sense (or non pragmatist liberals, but once again these would in our view would be better characterised by another adjective) — non liberal in the pragmatist sense are therefore all those who identify as belonging to the realm of extra-parliamentary politics.

First theorised by the likes of John Dewey and, more recently, someone like Jeremy Waldron, it is a form of liberal commitment that is embodied in the effort of always searching through discussions and deals a solution that will satisfy most, if not all parties — and that all within that space at least can tolerate.\[^{11}\] It is supported by the belief that to do so is almost always possible, underpinned by a

\[^{11}\] See Dewey, The Public and its problems & Liberalism and social action; See Waldron, 1986, What is Liberalism?
strong democratic ethos and a belief in a form of “Basic Equality”\textsuperscript{12} between human being — which in turn often translates in a faith in the role and power of reason as well as, very often, in meritocratic mechanisms.

At this point, someone may want to test the internal consistency of the framework by asking why there is no liberal individualists or liberal collectivists? The answer holds in the fact that the whole point of pragmatist liberalism is to be agnostic as regard this question of whether organisations should be, as a matter of principle, privately or collectively owned and organised. As a matter of fact, pragmatist liberalism was arguably born precisely from an effort to articulate why it is absurd to answer this question “as a matter of principle”: only the concrete experimentation and repeated inquiry of specific forms can prove which arrangement will be the most efficient to a given situation.

Some liberal, however, do believe that systematically pursuing the most economically profitable solution as a matter of principle will invariably yield the most efficient situation. They are liberal “capitalismist” — not technically speaking capitalists, because they do not necessarily distinguish themselves by the degree of their personal capital accumulation, but capitalism-ist, because they believe capitalism, roughly defined as the organisation of society in such a way that profit be the dominant determinant of most to all actions, is the best possible and most efficient of all principle around which to organise society. It is our view that these, who in Continental Europe often go under the name liberal, should be parochially known as Capitalists.

\textsuperscript{12} See Waldron, Basic Equality
Some Fundamental Theoretical Conceptions as applied to Political Reasoning
1.1.2. **Opposites & Correlatives: constitutive tensions**

Our map is named after a seminal paper by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, *Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning*, and very much inspired by contemporary efforts to expend his framework of analysis.\(^{13}\) Like its sources of inspirations, it is structured around fundamental oppositions. These we constructed out of those present in the graphs we saw before, in an attempt to learn from the strength and weaknesses of each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Political Compass™ (2001)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Oppositions</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>$\leq \neq \geq$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authoritarian Right</td>
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<td>Libertarian Right</td>
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<td>Authoritarian Left</td>
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<td>$\leq \neq \geq$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libertarian Right</td>
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<th>Bryson &amp; McDill (1968)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Oppositions</strong></td>
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<td>socialism</td>
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<td>$\leq \neq \geq$</td>
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<tr>
<td>aristocratic oligarchy</td>
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<th>Christie &amp; Meltzer (1970)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Oppositions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Radicalism</td>
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<td>$\leq \neq \geq$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fabianism</td>
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<td>Anarchism</td>
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<td>$\leq \neq \geq$</td>
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<td>Fascism</td>
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<td>Social Democracy</td>
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<td>$\leq \neq \geq$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
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<td>State Communism</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\leq \neq \geq$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capitalist Individualism</td>
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\(^{13}\) Hohfeld, ... ; for an excellent introduction to the piece and its significance, see Pierre Schlag, *How to do things with hohfeld* ; a brilliant contemporary attempt at widening and completing its framework through graphic representations and formal logic, see: Andrews, *Hohfeld's Cube*

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### Some political conceptions as applied to political reasoning

#### Fundamental theoretical oppositions

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<tr>
<th>State</th>
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<th>Market</th>
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<tr>
<td>Collectivism</td>
<td>≠ ≠ ≠</td>
<td>Individualism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>≠ ≠ ≠</td>
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<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>≠ ≠ ≠</td>
<td>Socialism</td>
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### Some political conceptions as applied to political reasoning

#### Radically opposed political forces

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<th>Anarchists</th>
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<th>Fascists</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>≠ ≠ ≠</td>
<td>Anarcho-Capitalists</td>
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<td>Green</td>
<td>≠ ≠ ≠</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>≠ ≠ ≠</td>
<td>Capitalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian socialists</td>
<td>≠ ≠ ≠</td>
<td>authoritarian capitalism-ists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian collectivists</td>
<td>≠ ≠ ≠</td>
<td>libertarian individualists</td>
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</table>
Some Fundamental Theoretical Conceptions as applied to Political Reasoning
1.1.3. **Why the Kolm triangle?**

Once this map has been constructed from the Kolm Triangle, and turned into the more regular shape of a square, it would make sense, before using it to look back at Unconditional Basic Income Politics, to pause for a moment and consider it from the point of view of our “shape of departure”. Why, then, are the Kolm Triangle, and consequently Van Parijs' Political Spectrum, Triangles? One rather straightforward way to explain it would be that the very idea of an Unconditional Basic Income embodies a fundamentally libertarian, anti-authoritarian spirit and philosophy. The absence of three fundamental conditions, that are almost always tied to the payment of an income in order to extract different things from those to whom is it being paid, means that the side which pays the income abandons the power which this action of paying usually grants over that which receives the payment. This may explain why, therefore, when looking at the political spectrum from this perspective, the liberal-authoritarian and fascist side of the iceberg are hidden from view, drowned in the cold and dark water of Authoritarianism, which do not take well on unconditionality. Yet, as we shall see latter on, this may prove to be deceitful, and down on earth where the ideals have to compromise with matter in order to take shape, we may have to consider the possibility of forms of Basic Income as of yet less studied than their progressive, anti-authoritarian counterparts. But let us not worry with these as of yet, and turn back for a moment on the Kolm Triangle in our fundamental conceptions as applied to political reasoning.
Authoritarian side of the political spectrum, *a priori* far less interested in the idea of a basic income than its libertarian counterpart.
1.2 **Illustrating the 3 ideal-typical UBI proposals**

We are thus left with 3 families of proposals.
1.2.1. The Communist Hypothesis: Bernard Friot's *Wage for Life*

France is the only western country not to have violently eliminated its communist minority. This has its advantages and drawbacks. An interesting consequence for what concerns us at present is the work of Bernard Friot, and his proposal of a *Salaire à Vie*, literally a wage-for life. A scholar of the progressive elaboration of the French Social Security System, Friot elaborated a social model incorporating a basic income proposal, inspired by the retirement regime of French civil servants. He also founded the *Réseau Salariat* (literally Salariat Network) as a popular education organisation and university research centre, around the time when the French government was attacking retirement rights, in order to develop this model and make it more well known.

Although he firmly denies it when asked and does not miss an occasion to criticise the name, Bernard Friot's normative social model does contain a proposal for an unconditional basic income, in every known definition of the concept (even the 4 criteria ones which we shall see a little latter on). What (radically) distinguishes Bernard Friot's proposal from other Unconditional Basic Income schemes, therefore, is not the intrinsic character of his ubi scheme (though at 1500€/ month, it is rather exceptional) — but rather the set of other measures which are to go around it.

implies the suppression of “lucrative property” and of all other forms of incomes but the UBI, and maybe a few other pay level above (for a final pay ladder of one to four in Bernard Friot's model). The pay level being “democratically attributed” by commissions which would evaluate one's contribution to society.

The generalisation of usage property

all wages paid to persons directly according to their qualification (and not to the job they do) by bodies managed by their own

all investment made by
Words on this political family, its way to represent ubi to itself, the goals it assigns to it, etc.

Essential point = meets the debate on the point of the amount of the income as it plans to suppress more or less every possibility of gaining money in another way than through the wage for life.
1.2.2. The Anarcho-Capitalist Utopia: From Milton to David Friedman

<> Anarcho – capitalist ubi = the full replacement of all of the state's activity by inter individual cash transfers. Milton Friedman would have probably not replaced all services, and kept the police and the army for instance, but his son argued that privatising these would also be more efficient
Words on this political family of anarcho capitalism, its way to represent ubi to itself, the goals it assigns to it, etc.

This time also focuses the debate on the amount, but for opposite reasons: once it would have related all state services and/or tax credit, the amount matters greatly.
1.2.3. One of the many faces of the Libertarian ideal: the “other model” of unemployment compensation of the French *intermittents du spectacle*

Libertarian – socialist = the “new model” of the French intermittent of the spectacle ... and virtually every single real world ubi proposal
Words on this political family, its way to represent ubi to itself, the goals it assigns to it, etc.
1.3 On border strifes and bad faith reading: the authoritarian peril

1.3.1. The stakes in Defining
In their seminal work on the many faces of unconditional basic income, de Wispelaere and Stirton identify 7 criteria on which a Basic Income policy can play while arguably remaining within the boundaries of the definition recognised by BIEN: Universality, Individuality, Conditionality, Uniformity, Frequency/Duration, Modality and Adequacy. The key point is to remind all UBI supporters that there is a greater enemy, and that this enemy is presently winning.

1.3.2. The Authoritarian Peril
Comes from playing with the criterias and the ambiguity of the word in the definition; as well as the essentially contested character of a concept such as “political community”

1.3.3. The Grey reality: why only the shades of liberty really concern us
After this long voyage on the celestial seas of political theory, and this dive deeply into the cold watters of it is well time to come back down, closer to actual concrete prospects for the implementation of these different concrete proposals. For there we obviously get a totally different tune. The tabula rasa implied in both the communist hypothesis scheme and the anarcho-capitalist ones appear extremely far away now, for if everything is possible in theory, a long, long time can pass before some radical actions of this sort are undertaken. And their advocates are very aware of it. Bernard Friot, for instance, repeatedly stated his rejection of the “grand soir” and the over night revolution. The revolution is to him a slow dialectical and conflictual process that may take up to a thousand year, and his aim is merely to brush a portrait of a desirable alternative, in order for us today to direct our efforts to its realisation. And though less explicit about it, Gaspard Koenig surely share a similar feeling, though towards a radically opposite end. He too progresses step by step in the direction of what appears to him as the best of all possible world. The main advocates of these radical view, in short, are well aware of the fact that, as de Wispelaere and Stirton put it: “It is a mistake to assume that a universal basic income would operate in something resembling an institutional vacuum.”

And after all these theoretical developments, it would seem that we are therefore left to face the rough reality: neither the suppression of most sources of income nor that of most public services, tax credit and state benefit being at the ordre du jour, then every single realistic or short term proposal will belong to the larger family of the liberal-libertarian basic income proposals. And,
absent these radical solution of narrowing down either the way wealth is distributed or the social protection system organised, we are back to the point with which we started this section: when considering the implementation of a given basic income scheme, the accompanying measures and changes will always matter far more than its intrinsic specific characteristic. No real sense of either the effect or political orientation of any unconditional basic income design considered in isolation. Let us now turn to the consequences this has for the real world struggle for the implementation of Basic Income schemes — as well as to the stakes of taking the risk to ignore that warning nay longer.

2. **Real World Consequences on the struggle for an income and a room of one's own**

2.1 Lost in Translation: On the very different meanings of the notion of “full” and “partial” Basic Income in Brussels and Helsinki (or, “High Enough … for what? The concrete perils of the Neoliberal, Anarcho-Capitalist Fallacy”)

*Traduttore, Traditore*, the Italians like to say. But beyond the fact that every translation is a treason, lies another, less often acknowledge fact: that the meaning of the same word, in the very same language, often changes according to the setting in which it is pronounced. Something we could perhaps refer to as intra-lingual translation, to distinguish it from its more famous inter-lingual counterpart. Of more interest to us than its name, however, is how much this form of translation also reveals in the treacherous seas of its double entendres. One such remarkable alteration in meaning may shine much light on the debate which interests us here: it is the difference in the meaning of the english expression “Full Basic Income” and “Partial Basic Income” in different parts of Europe. More specifically the difference between, on the one hand, the meaning recognised by BIEN affiliated organisations *Unconditional Basic Income – Europe* (henceforth UBI-E) and the German *Netzwerk Grundinkommen* (henceforth NGI); and, on the other hand, the meaning given to these same expression in another part of Europe, as it is seriously considering first experimenting with, then implementing, Unconditional Basic Income: Finland. The most developed account of these expression's meaning available in english to this author's knowledge being, in the german and european wide context, the texts of Ronald Blaschke, member of Die Linke, founding member of both the NGI as well as of UBI-E, and long time Basic Income Activist. While on the Finn side, they will be the work of Olli Kangas, responsible for presenting Finland's government with the report on the possible experimentation and director of Kela, the Finn agency in charge of
the management of social security.

2.1.1 In Brussels: “Full” as high enough to ensure a dignified existence

To Ronald Blaschke, UBI-E and the NGI, as illustrated below in a slide from a presentation mr Baschke gave in Brussels, the definition of a basic income comprises not 3, but 4 essential elements — Thus adding to the individual, means-test and work-test free defining characteristics of the BIEN the condition that, in order to be a basic income, the transfer must be high enough “to ensure a material existence and participation in society”.

As they were not however in a position to refuse the name basic income to a number of scheme proposal which answered the first three criteria, they added an adjective to (dis)qualify these: they were not basic incomes, but only “partial” basic incomes, because they did not satisfy this fourth criteria. In the words of Ronald Blaschke himself:
Partial basic incomes are cash transfers which (...) do not guarantee material security and participation in society for the individual because they are not generous enough.  

Interestingly enough, Blaschke goes on to precise his thought by drawing for us a wide definition of poverty and exclusion which the Unconditional Basic Income is meant to combat:

The term poverty here means income poverty. In the countries of Europe and in the world generally, financial income is a very important (though not the only)
prerequisite of guaranteed material security and participation in society. Guaranteed material security is understood to mean, for example, the assurance of adequate and healthy nutrition, health care, decent housing and proper clothing. Participation in society is understood to mean, for example, access to education, knowledge, culture and political and civil opportunities to shape society, but also the ability to enjoy fulfilling social and interpersonal relationships. 16

At this point already, one may start to wonder if an income alone could ever cover the whole range of the needs listed above, and start to have doubts as to the direction in which this project is taking us. Yet me may, on the up side, notice that at this point poverty is defined holistically and several needs in services are acknowledged over and above the material ones. But we shall come back to this latter, and must first stop to ponder on the the straightforwardly dangerous part that comes next:

a minimum income, whether it is a basic or minimum security provision or a basic income, must not be lower than the poverty risk threshold, otherwise it will do nothing to combat poverty and will not guarantee material security and participation in society. 17

At best utterly uninformed and at worse a nasty exercise in class struggle against the fourth world of the poorest and most excluded (which some marxists still call 'lumpen proletariat') and the working poors, this statement reveals what appears to be deep blindness to the most important challenge which social protection systems have to face in the 21st century: that of the non take up of social benefits (Defined as the fact that people entitled to social benefits, for whatever reason, as a matter of fact do not receive them). In 2004, a report from the OECD analysing data from nearly all countries member to the organisation (that is almost all industrialised countries), estimated that "low take-up of welfare benefits occurs both across countries and programmes. Estimates typically span a range of between 40% and 80% in the case of social assistance and housing programmes, and between 60% and 80% for unemployment compensation".

In the case of France, which we know best, the social minim known as the RSA-Socle, a monthly payment of 460€/month (Actually 520 but of which 60€ are deduced each month if the person also received help for housing — which nearly all do) to which are eligible those who have no other

16 Ibid at 6
17 Ibid at 8
declared income than it, has an estimated non take up rate of … 38%. Meanwhile, the RSA-Activité, which is the income complement to which the working poors are entitled, rocketed at a sad non take up rate of 68%. Now, if 500€ is a ridiculously and even dangerously low amount, equivalent of about half of the statistical poverty threshold as defined as 60% of the median income — to argue from there that an extra 500€/ Month to people who are absolutely penyless and/or to people earning low wages would “do nothing to combat poverty” or to help guarantee material security and participation in society is somewhat outrageous, and at least the sign of a deep-seated ignorance of the reality of the situations of the poors and low-income earners. As any Unconditional Basic Income supporter, mr Blaschke must also know that a key element of basic income is that it would removes the stigma of assistance from this income, which everyone would get, as opposed to the selective assistance policy such as the RSA. This impression of taking rather lightly matters of implementation and of jumping to odd conclusions in that domain is confirmed a little further by another quite strange statement

In addition, if the partial basic income is combined with existing basic or minimum security provisions, the existing conditional cash transfer will be reduced accordingly the amount of the partial basic income. Because the basic or minimum provision are means-tested, that is, any other income reduces this conditional cash transfer.

The income situation of the poor would not be changed.  

Putting aside the question of the non-take up in social benefits which we have just dealt with, and going back to our reflection in the previous section of this paper as to how to distinguish between the political orientation of UBI Schemes, this statement appears as extremely perplexing … Why, if an unconditional basic income of a low amount were to be introduced with the objective of alleviating the situation of the poorest, the most excluded and the working poors — why then would such a scheme be financed by a reduction in the rest of the assistance to the poors or the middle classes, rather than, for instance, the suppression of Tax Credit which benefits the very rich more than those middle classes and extremely poors?

An unconditional basic income gives everyone the assurance of material security and participation in society – if it is topped up to provide adequate health care (where the person concerned has no other source of income) or if in this case

18 Ibid at 12
health care is available free of charge. This will consistently eradicate income poverty and its consequences.  

Unfortunately, many do not share in this optimism. There are more needs that have to be covered than only health and money, starting with housing and schooling for instance. There we see the holistic view of people's need in services as well as goods provision dissapear

the fact of having an unconditional basic income will save the cost of many existing basic or minimum security provisions that are financed out of tax revenue.  

Is somewhat of a preposterous statement, which seems to ignore of the work that has been done trying to develop the difficulties associated with the real world concrete implementation of a ubi scheme, particularly in a state with important bureaucratic apparatus

partial basic incomes do not in themselves eradicate income poverty. All they can do – depending on how they are structured – is relieve poverty. They force people to take jobs for economic reasons, even if the working conditions associated with those jobs are bad. Partial basic incomes also force people to apply for additional social transfers which are discriminatory and stigmatising. They do not give individuals a guarantee of material security and participation in society. They can be misused as a way of cutting levels of social protection and when this happens they are rejected and opposed by potential allies in the basic income movement,  

as if a “high enough” basic income could not be “misused” as a way of cutting levels of social protection? Yet this is in the end the strongest argument against a “partial” basic income:

The conclusion of all this reasoning being that, when contemplating the step forward towards the implementation of a UBI, and as this last substantive slide of his Brussel presentation emphasises well, mr Blaschke does not consider the implementation of a UBI at the level of existing social minimums as a desirable goal worth agitating for, or even as a step on the way to Basic Income.  

19 Ibid at 10  
20 Ibid at 11  
22 Blaschke, 2014, at 14, emphasis added
Conclusion

Unconditional Basic Income is an effective means of tackling poverty and hidden poverty and promoting freedom for all and democracy, the partial basic income not.

Thoughts on the way forward

Steps to eradicate poverty and to introduce UBI are possible for each life-time stage:

- adequate basic income for all children (childhood / youth)
- abolition of forced labour and individualisation of existing basic / minimum security provisions, adequate level (unemployed)
- adequate basic income for sabbatical (employed)
- adequate universal basic pension (pensioner)

Steps are supported by many allies and help to gain acceptance the UBI within society.
2.1.2 In Helsinki: “Full” high enough ... to replace all other state transfer

Models to be explored and developed

- Full basic income (BI)
  - The level of BI is high enough to replace almost all insurance-based benefits
  - Must be rather a high monthly sum
- Partial basic income
  - Replaces all 'basic' benefits but almost all insurance-based benefits left intact
  - Minimum level should not be lower than the present day minimum level of basic benefits (ca net € 550 a month)
- Negative income tax
  - Income transfers via taxation system
- Other models
  - Perhaps low BI plus 'participation' income

See generally: http://www.kela.fi/web/en/experimental-study-on-a-universal-basic-income
http://fr.slideshare.net/kelantutkimus/experimental-study-on-a-universal-basic-income-in-finland
http://fr.slideshare.net/kelantutkimus/olli-kangas-basic-income-experiment-in-finland

Models explored and developed

- Full basic income (BI)
  - The level of BI is high enough to replace almost all insurance-based benefits
  - Must be rather a high monthly sum, e.g. 1 000€-1 500€. Realistic?
- Partial basic income
  - Replaces all 'basic' benefits but almost all insurance-based benefits left intact
  - Minimum level should not be lower than the present day minimum level of basic benefits (€ 550 - € 600 a month)
  - Plus income-related benefits and housing & child allowance
- Negative income tax
  - Income transfers via taxation system
- Other models
  - Perhaps low BI plus 'participation' income

24 http://fr.slideshare.net/kelantutkimus/experimental-study-on-a-universal-basic-income-in-finland
25 Ccc http://fr.slideshare.net/kelantutkimus/olli-kangas-basic-income-experiment-in-finland
2.2 Why Cash Violates Neutrality (or, “why high enough ain't ever gonna be good enough”)

At this point in our demonstration, a case may be brought against us that we have so far, in our argument as to why high enough a Basic Income is not good enough to ensure on its own “a material existence and participation in society”, considered only political context related pragmatist or realistic reasons why it would be so. One might therefore argue that, come what may, these contextual political factors can always be overturned, and faster than one may think — at least somewhere on earth. Particularly so since we admit ourselves that the figurative representation of the western political spectrum which we have offered in this paper has universalistic ambitions, and that the actual concrete political space of a given country, region or city may be (and very often is) much narrower, concentrated in one or the other area of the spectrum — forcing those who recognise themselves in another end of the spectrum either to odd alliances or to a form of political apathy.

In the paper from which this section draws its name, however, Vida Panitch and Joseph Heath set out to demonstrate on a normative ground why replacing all of the social protection services by cash transfers would worsen the situation of a great many. They argue that “a hypertrophied concern for individual liberty, combined with an aversion to any institutional arrangement that appears paternalistic, has obscured the need for a balanced mixture of welfare-state services by effectively excluding from consideration the interests of the intemperate”. Quoting from Stuart White, they argue that many such arrangements to deliver in-kind social services rather than cash transfers are actually misclassified as paternalistic, as “Individuals have long relied not only upon their own will power, but also upon the cooperative assistance of others as a way of avoiding the extremes of intemperance, [using] social institutions as a way of carrying out precommitment strategies.”

2.3 What's in a name: A Room of One's Own & the notion of false commodity

“A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction”, Virginia Woolf famously wrote herself — yet the book's title is A Room, and not an income, of one's own.

Land as a polanyian false commodity relates to the housing crisis. A basic income cannot on its own solve the housing crisis.

As Antonella Corsani, drawing on Gayatri Spivak, reminds us, Virginia Woolf's income comes from the death of a distant aunt in India — a clear reference to colonial exploitation and the global injustice that made her emancipation possible. Someting for Basic Income supporters to ponder.

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26 See Colin Ward, cotters and squatters; as well as Penalver & Katyal, Property outlaws
27 Corsani, 2006, Quelles sont les conditions nécessaires pour l'émergence de multiples récits du monde? [What are
Conclusion: Land in Sight

“Towards an Emancipatory Form of Social Protection”: Accounting for political alliances and developing strategies for social change through Nancy Fraser's re-reading of Karl Polanyi

As this journey is drawing to an end, and before paying a visit to one last friendly figure, there is one thing we absolutely need to make quite clear: our sympathies do lie with the notion that one form or another of unconditional social protection, guaranteeing every individuals the concrete means of their autonomy and independence, without conditions, is highly desirable. And we are convinced that any such form of unconditional, emancipatory social protection would need to incorporate an Unconditional Basic Income of a significant amount. Further, we also believe that this significant level or UBI should eventually be set at at least that of the statistical poverty threshold, and therefore pegged at some point between 50% to 60% of the median income. What's more, we are also very much seduced by the fact that this pegging mechanism would add to the disarming beauty of the Basic Income idea an exceptional and remarkable self regulating property, ensuring its long term stability, and with it the complete and durable eradication of income poverty in a given population: for if too many people leave their jobs to live off their UBI, then the median income would decrease, and so would the UBI, up to the point where some would prefer to return to a part time paid job, which would make the median income rise, and with it the basic income — and so on, until the UBI mechanism has reached its equilibrium for the given time and place. But we certainly are, however, radically opposed to the replacement of all social services and collective insurances by a single unconditional cash transfers, and have little to no faith the capacity of such a system to last in time and/ or guarantee neither the autonomy nor independence of even only just the majority of the population. This is why the increasingly systematic and often exclusive focus of the Basic Income debates on the amount of Unconditional Basic Income schemes, hailed as being the core element of any scheme's design, and the key to determine both its political orientation and transformative potential, has grown to make us more and more worried. For at present a Basic Income of a significant amount that would replace all forms of state services and explicitely state organised transfer would appear to us as a clear cut case of social regression. And as this focus on the amount culminated in the tentative amendment to the definition recognised by BIEN, brought forth in this very congress, we felt very much obligated to gather our ideas, find support for our arguments, and do our best to express our concerns as clearly as we could. Let us therefore repeat once more the central thesis of this paper: The key element to assessing the

the necessary conditions for the emergence of a multiplicity of world views], Multitude 2006/4 n°27, pp.43-55 refering to Spivak, 2003, Death of a Discipline, Columbia University Press, 136p. chap 2: Collectivities, pp.25-70
transformative potential, political orientation and concrete effects of a Basic Income Scheme is not to be found in particular design of the scheme itself, but rather in the sum of all the other changes its introduction causes to the given system of social protection in which it is implemented. The internal details of a given scheme's design — such as the amount and regularity of the payment — considered in isolation, won't ever on their own tell us anything significative about that scheme's transformative potential, political orientation or concrete effects. For one things because, as Jurgen de Wispelaere and Lindsay Stirton put it: “universal schemes that are substantially similar in design may still end up producing widely divergent outcomes because of different interaction effects with policies already in place”. For another thing because, as we saw with the work of Vida Panitch, what may be the only way to avoid these interaction effects, namely the replacement of almost all state services and state operated social transfers by an Unconditional Basic Income, on top of being utterly unrealistic, is also very vulnerable to critiques from a normative standpoint. Firstly because it increases commodification ; secondly because, as Vida Panitch and joseph Heath have emphasised, “cash violates neutrality” — adversely disadvantaging those less experienced in handling large amounts of cash and in creating security for oneself by investing into hard assets ; as well the improvident and intemperate, who generally exhibit a preference for in kind provision as self binding mechanisms — ; and, thirdly, because a number of goods are false commodities, which do not behave like generic commodities do, even when considered as such, and whose provision cannot therefore be adequately met by market mechanisms, which are based on the generic property of commodities. Consequently, the idea that a given amount of cash could ever cover all of everyone's basic needs was pointed out as something of a neo-liberal, anarcho-capitalist fallacy. In other words, the essential point to consider, when looking at a specific unconditional basic income scheme's design, is not the net amount that the beneficiaries will receive: rather, it is the difference in the distribution of wealth before and after the scheme's introduction. The fundamental question then, when dealing with the introduction of a universal basic income, as with that of any measures of this dimension and importance, is to know who will be the net beneficiaries of this introduction, and who will be the ones to pay, either by loosing potentially illegitimate privileges, or by being exploited more. And answering that question requires us to know, in addition to the amount that is being paid, at the very least how the given scheme is finance and, more importantly perhaps, in the case where it is to replace other benefits or tax credits, which ones, at what level, and to what effect ?

The concrete risks for the intellectual debate to focus only on the criteria of the amount only was outlined through a comparison of the slightly different, though not contradictory, meaning taken by
the notion of "full" and "partial" basic income at different points on the european continent: From the german network definition of a “full” basic income as one that is “High enough” … to allow material comfort and participation in society become; To the Finn's definition of a “Full” basic income as being “High Enough” … to replace all other state benefits, and therefore 'of a significant amount' — paving the way for Unconditional Basic Income Scheme Design that betray the spirit of the fourth criteria brought fourth by the german speaking left, while scrupulously respecting its wording. Bearing this in mind, it seems to us that the amendment to the definition recognised by the BIEN which is being brought forth by representatives of that german speaking left, asking to add a criteria of being high enough to ensure material existence and participation in society, as it makes no mention whatsoever of guaranteeing this in combination with other social services, is problematic — though not altogether unacceptable. It is problematic because it would amount to carving into stone the problematic and unclear distinction between "partial" and "full" basic income, and consequently tend to reinforce the risks and confusions associated with it. Interestingly enough, it is even likely to have the opposite effect to that which is intended by the overtly leftist supporters of this modification to the definition recognised by BIEN. For as talks of implementation and new experimentations are under way, the greatest fear, to the larger part of the left (whether already of not yet versed in the basic income debates) is, rightly, that of seeing basic income replace social protection and insurance system. Something which most proposals to provide a “high enough” basic income would do. Therefore, as more studies will appear declaring that in order to finance a high level of basic income, social states would have to sacrifice all other forms of social insurance and assistance mechanisms, the introduction by BIEN of an additional criteria demanding of unconditional basic income schemes that they be “high enough” to be worthy of the very name “Basic Income”, might actually mark BIEN as being a right-wing, anarcho-capitalist organisation — rather than send to the global left the sign of good will and reverence to its cause that the overtly leftist supporters of this amendment hope it would be.

In order to see clearer into this paradoxical fact, and so as to be able to better understand the mechanisms at play in the ambivalence of the positions which led to this amendment proposal, we may usefully turn to the writings of american feminist and social theorist of emancipation Nancy Fraser. In her re reading of Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation which she first published in

2010, she offered to complicate the famous Austro-Hungarian's account of a double movement between the forces of Marketisation and that of Social Protection which led, in the latter's analysis, through the failure of the fin de siècle and interwar period liberalism, to the two world wars and the complete destruction of “nineteenth century civilisation”. Drawing on the fact that Polanyi included, in the social protection reaction to the marketisation of society, groups ranging from internationalist socialists to xenophobic nationalists, fascists and totalitarian regimes; Fraser criticised from a feminist standpoint the incapacity of that dual representation to account for the ambivalence of social protection, many form thereof being attached to oppressive social control, themselves ranging from paternalistic to straightforwardly exploitative situations. In order to redeem Polanyi's framework of analysis from this fatal flaw, Fraser offered the idea that there had been from the start not a double, but rather a triple movement, with the addition of the forces of emancipation. Her argument, in a nutshell, is that the widespread marketisation of society could only have succeed with the support of the oppressed, to whom marketisation in many cases proved itself to be quite emancipatory. To make this point more concrete, she takes the example of women and slaves, to whom even extremely exploitative wage labor in which they had a certain degree of choice and were recognised to some extent as adult and autonomous individual were far more emancipatory than being legally considered as children or object because of their gendered or racial assignation at birth.29 We would like to add that for a great many of the fourth world of the poorest and most excluded of society also, marketisation proved to open vastly the realm of possibilities and, over a few centuries, make the positions of a great many of them substantially better. However this is not the place to go into the details and limits of this argument.30 More relevant to us here, perhaps, is how Nancy Fraser's triple movement idea can be further developed by the four dimensional representation we have elaborated in the first half of this paper. For it would appear that this four dimensional representation answers the often heard critique (though as of yet not, to our knowledge, ever articulated in written form) that this movement for emancipation is “not on the same level” as that of marketisation and social protection. It does so by at the once conceding some truth to that statement, while at the same time neutralising it completely: the assertion that if there is nothing intrinsically authoritarian or libertarian in either marketisation or social protection, any usage of either must always lean towards one or the other, does grant that we are dealing with two different

30 For convergent analysis, see Fontaine, 2014, Le Marché : Histoire et Usages d'une Conquête Sociale [The Market: History and Usages of a Social Conquest]; for a lucid review and firm opposition to some of the book’s most far reaching claims, see Skorniki, 2015, Le Marché, entre domination et émancipation [The Market, between domination and emancipation], La Vie des Idées, available at <http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Le-marche-entre-domination-et-emancipation.html>, last accessed on the 10th of June 2017, which is followed by a response from the author
axis, but only to emphasise that it makes little to no sense to read positions on the one without also looking at where someone or something stands on the other. Which is precisely the point that Nancy Fraser tries to make in her re-reading of Karl Polanyi: pursuing there her critique of the ambivalence of mainstream feminist movement's tacit alliance with the capitalist rhetoric, she goes on to argue that the alliance of the forces of emancipation with that of marketisation, though having once benefited greatly to the general emancipation, is today becoming largely counter productive. Thus the marketisation of all things is today reaching new extremes and producing much oppression. Coming back to her examples of women and former slaves, she invokes the all-too-real image of the afro american single mother, forced by workfare programs to take several jobs, hours away from each other as well as from her home, to the point where she is actively prevented by exhaustion and capitalist exploitation to care for her own children — as the almost caricatural example of what was once a source of emancipation through access to (the job) market, and which has now turned brutally oppressive. Her work therefore ends with a plea for the forces of emancipation to renounce their dangerous liaison with the forces of marketisation, so as to find tie a new alliance with the forces of emancipation — and work towards the elaboration of emancipatory forms of social protection. A call which strongly echoes that of the European Citizen Initiative (ECI, a european wide petition) for an Unconditional Basic Income, launched less than two years after Fraser first published her piece, and whose subtitle read: Exploring a pathway towards emancipatory welfare conditions in the EU.31 Interestingly enough, it is common knowledge amongst european supporters of Unconditional Basic Income that the redactor of the text of that initiative just so happen to be the same people who are now bringing forward the amendment for BIEN to modify its definition. As it is extremely unlikely that they had read Fraser's text before doing so, we may only hope that the troubling proximity of their wordings and spirit bring them to hear her warning: because societies cannot be commodities all the way down, high enough a basic income, ain't ever gonna be good enough to ensure, on its own, an emancipatory form of social protection.

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